How social media are used for radicalisation

85% of European households have access to the internet from home, 79% of EU citizens use the internet on a regular basis and 71% even use it daily. Age plays an important role in this respect. The young are especially active online: 93% of those aged between 16 and 24 are regular users, whereas only 57% of the 55- to 74-year-olds are. [1] Social media are a prime means for youth connecting and communicating their ideas, hobbies and lifestyle. Simultaneously they become, however, easily vulnerable to online radicalisation. In order to inhibit this threat we need to know its mechanisms.

Extremist groups, most prominently in recent years ISIS, have been using the internet for their recruiting purposes. Social media are ranging particularly high in their toolkit, as platforms such as Twitter, Facebook or YouTube offer multiple advantages for them:

First, they are easily and fast accessible for almost anyone in the world, which enables international communication without necessitating travel. This feature is even further enhanced by the widespread use of smartphones. So there is a vast potential audience that can be addressed at the same time. Second, all this can be done for free. No funding is needed. In contrast, it causes high costs to track and remove unwanted content from the web. Also, different legislation regimes private global provider companies operate in complicate the matter. It is a demanding task for governments to monitor ongoing processes of online radicalisation, as the sheer volume is so overwhelming. For instance, every minute 300 hours of videos are uploaded on YouTube, it is impossible to keep in check whether problematic content is transported. [2] Also, the odds of being detected are low. Criminals can easily set up fake accounts hiding their true identity when publishing radical propaganda.

Social media, moreover, offer a wide range of functions extremists know exactly how to exploit: Besides general provision of information, logistics and advertisements, followers are informed about happenings e.g. on battlefields in almost real time via status updates. Far-away occurrences are brought into the users’ emotional vicinity. Also, fake news can be spread. Strategically clever tweets can, for example, be mistaken for actual information by the press and create a big media hype, which brings great attention to extremists’ aims. When conducted on a large scale, extremists can create a feeling of ubiquity. Using manifold accounts and channels, posting and reposting updates, spamming life coverage and other forms of propaganda intimidates the wide public, because extremists establish the illusion of a permanent threat. Additionally, social media filtering algorithms are able to create an information bubble by presenting similar contents in individual newsfeeds.

According to their ideology, extremist groups target the established society, still they copy successful marketing methods of the latter. One is so-called narrowcasting, where a specific audience is identified first. In the case of extremist interests, this would comprise people who might have informed themselves for once about radical ideas, downloaded respective videos or used matching keywords in their own posts. Once detected, these people are directly targeted with propagandistic content, e.g. in their newsfeed, their recommended videos etc. Another online strategy is the provision of video games that are based on extremist narratives. Islamist game designs, for instance, aim at portraying a harsh war between the global East and West, establishing a clear image of the enemy. The method is actually copied from US military training aiming at shaping combatants’ mindsets and attentiveness.

All that seems very intimidating and difficult to contain. However, we must not lose faith so easily, since exactly that would meet a specific objective of extremist groups – intimidation and triggering feelings of helplessness and surrender. Governments need to invest in research on extremist online practices and on effective means of timely counteraction. Ongoing observation has to be in place, because hostile processes change just as rapidly as the whole ICT sector does. The most important step in the fight of radicalisation – if conducted online or offline alike – is information: If potential subjects are well informed about extremist narratives, strategies, and dangers, they are able to resist propaganda even if targeted, because they understand the underlying fraud. Nevertheless, it is pivotal to keep investing in online safety measures in order to preserve the positive and progressive nature of the internet.

References

[1] Eurostat. Statistics explained (2016). Internet access and use statistics – households and individuals. [online] available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Internet_access_and_use_statistics_-_households_and_individuals.

[2] Alardi, M. (2016). Recruitment and Radicalization: The Role of Social Media and New Technology. In: M. Hughes, M. Miklaucic, ed., Impunity, 1^st ed. USA: CCO, PKSOI, pp. 313-340. [online] available at: http://cco.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Impunity/Article/780274/chapter-13-recruitment-and-radicalization-the-role-of-social-media-and-new-tech/.