Guide

We break the law of the frame: liquid owners, stakeholders and first-line practitioners

The Cube Toolkit revolutionises the Law of the Frame principle, according to which someone can understand a painting only if they look at it from the outside. Instead, we try to understand the picture by staying inside the situations, often by observing them from within and constantly changing the point of observation from within.

In current prevention theories, stakeholders, first-line practitioners and owners of preventive actions are seen as static role-players and, in some cases, very confused ones at that. Conversely, the first fact on which the ‘Cube’ helps us to reflect is that these roles change according to the environment and, in many cases, they can also be reversed or excluded. The direct consequence is that harm reduction measures to be applied in context ‘A’ can be completely different to those required if a corresponding event occurs in context ‘B’.

A given criminal tactic (for example, an individual suicide bombing) can have different meanings and require completely different prevention and response measures, albeit under a coherent narrative scenario, if it is perpetrated in Berlin or in Cairo, where very different environmental conditions and real motivations exist, with first-line practitioners and stakeholders taking on very different functions in relation to the environment.

For the purposes of our model, for example, confusing different types of conflict, such as events linked to counter-insurgencies, which constitute political-military strategies, with those linked to counter-terrorism, which addresses tactical phenomena in civil contexts, leads to wrong prevention and contrast strategies, as David Kilcullen has clearly explained (D.Kilcullen 2010, 2013, 2016).

The effects of these misguided analyses may be detrimental to safety, as recent studies have shown. In the case of terrorism, Sean M. Zeigler, an associate political scientist, and Meagan Smith, a quantitative analyst at RAND Corporation, have shown the close connection between terrorism and ‘war on terror’, based upon a quantitative analysis combining data from the Global Terrorism Database, from the University of Maryland, with civil war and insurgency data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in 194 countries. Spanning the years 1989 to 2014 allowed the researchers to directly compare terrorist attacks in the early post-Cold War era with those since 2001.

Their recent conclusions confirm the connection between terrorism and foreign politics, which is one of the much-debated topics lacking in ‘Prevent’:

“While terror-related headlines tend to imply the worst, the truth is much more prosaic. Terrorism since 9/11 is down – and dramatically so – in countries not suffering from civil wars and insurgencies. The majority of terror incidents that have taken place during the global war on terror were linked with insurgencies and civil wars. While this was still the case before 2001, the association between terrorism and insurgency has grown significantly stronger during the era of the war on terror.”[1]

Before 2001, countries with higher Muslim populations experienced less domestic terrorism, while since 9/11, these countries have seen significantly more– both domestic and international. This pattern is particularly strong in places recently afflicted with conflicts, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, and Sudan.

This finding may be a result of domestic upheavals in parts of the Muslim world and Islamist groups’ involvement in Arab Spring-related conflicts. Islamist insurgencies have risen since 2001 and an increase in terrorism is likely a byproduct of this fact. It is possible that defensive measures in the West have forced a shift in targets. While jihadist terrorism has become more enduring and widespread in the past 15 years, as suggested by the reversal in Muslim-majority countries, it remains more local than global.

Importantly, interventions by Western countries may likewise be contributing to this pattern of terrorism in Muslim countries. Unsurprisingly, we found a positive correlation between Western military interventions on behalf of governments fighting civil wars and domestic terrorism in those countries. The models revealed that Western intervention was associated with anywhere from a two to five-fold increase in the expected number of domestic attacks. No doubt, intervening nations only participate in the most protracted and pernicious wars – those most likely to exhibit terrorism in the first place, suggesting that Western interventions may be a symptom of terrorism in these countries as well as a possible cause. In the past decade and a half, this includes multi-sided insurgencies in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Mali.”[2]

In a similar vein and with evident hindsight, we recall the results of academic research and experience which confirm the close link between failed states, corrupt and non-performing governments and organised crime. Such actors take possession of the territory to carry out their criminal activities, in some cases using terrorist tactics or exploiting para-political models to achieve their goals.

When analysing a criminal event, we must be very specific about the crime itself but we should also place it in its geographical and territorial context, analysing its variations in similar contexts.

This is useful for understanding what types of prevention and response to implement, also with respect to their impact and the actual availability of means. Although it may come across as politically incorrect, it cannot be denied that also the walls of the DDR (Germany), Palestine or Ireland, performed their functions effectively in their time and context, with respect to the primary interests of the respective governments of the time. Conversely, such walls erected on the border between Mexico and the US, for example, make another impression, because the political conditions and values of freedom, multi-ethnicity and free movement in the USA have a different value and carry another weight compared to security demands. Hence, simply stated, the hard or soft means to be adopted in prevention must be considered in relation to the factors involved and their proportionality.

In these subjects, as Nick Ross reminds us[3], we should shun ideology and be very flexible. It is clear, for example, that specific strategies to protect targets in a European cities will differ substantially from those applicable in anti-terrorist actions in countries such as Syria or Libya, because the level of priority of the threat, real or perceived, is different, even if it can resort to the same terrorist tactics (e.g. suicide attacks). Similarly today, for example in Yemen, Egypt or Israel, it would not be very sensible to apply the very effective anti-terrorism prevention models of the Irish Garda, for the simple fact that the (real or perceived) environmental, social and security conditions are totally different.

In certain countries, to continue the example, problems of a political nature elicit responses of a singularly security-biased or military nature. In others, conversely, the security element is nothing more than a component of a much broader conflict management endeavour. If it is over-emphasised, there is risk of doing damage.

“If we get it right: (1) Terrorism can often be nipped in the bud; (2) ‘Situational’ measures such as target hardening are effective; (3) Tough military countermeasures are highly beneficial when precisely targeted; (4) Intelligence is king; (5) but compromise is emperor.” (Ross, 2009, pg. 241).

How to prioritise responses, allocate resources and which tools to use in terms of policies and practices – all of these variables must defer to the more general context, which is a fundamental condition of the security scenario.

The following distinctions, therefore, are not readily accepted from a methodological and scientific point of view:

1. the comparison that is often made between terrorist tactics in war or transition scenarios and phenomena of violence in Western countries;
2. The adoption of extreme and disproportionate strategies, as David Altheide wrote, that limit “our intellectual and moral capacities, it turns us against others, it changes our behaviour and our perspective and it makes us vulnerable to those who would control us to promote their own agendas.”

The SCP approach envisaged a multiple prevention model based on capable guardians, handlers and place/institutional managers. This classification is parallel to that now in vogue based on the terms first-line practitioners (=place/institutional managers) and stakeholders (=capable guardians, handlers), which are more generic.

As for criminal phenomena, the labels of organised crime and terrorism cover a plurality of phenomena, so behind these labels of stakeholders and first-line practitioners are hidden a plurality of subjects with diverse and, in many cases, divergent interests and agendas.

The idea of the Cube is based on the idea that critical events always take place because some of the actors involved have not adequately done their job in line with their social mission definition. As Clarke (2006) noticed, many problems occur because one or more institutions are unable or unwilling to undertake a preventive strategy, or because these institutions have intentionally established a circumstance that stimulates crimes or disorder. This creates risky facilities and other concentrations of crime.

The first finding is trivial and easy to understand: in a given country, common security problems emerging in different contexts imply diverse owners or varying degrees of ownership. If a juvenile crime case ‘X’ occurs in an environment ‘A’ (for example a school in Milan), it will have different roles and levels of responsibility with respect to a corresponding crime case ‘X’ occurring in an environment ‘B’ (for example a prison in Naples).

The idea that prevention is linked to the prominence of the security or intelligence forces is misleading. Solving problems usually requires the active cooperation of the people and institutions that have failed to take into account the conditions that lead to the problem. These people have shifted the ownership of the problem from their shoulders to the shoulders of the police. Consequently, an important goal of any problem-solving process is to get them to assume ownership and the related social responsibility.

But there is another more profound finding that deserves to be mentioned. We must not be afraid to admit that many problems related to organized crime and terrorism in Europe can arise from the contradictions of our political, social or economic systems. It is not always the case that a Da’ysh, a ‘senior mentor’, a recruiter or an international dark plot inspire terrorist events or mafia crimes, contrary to what the press and politics try to promulgate under the current belief system.

Many problems arise through the failure or refusal of some institution – business, government agency, civil society or other organisation – to conduct their activity in a way that prevents crime rather than causing it. In some cases, the activities of some social agencies may even be the trigger of security events.

In short, many problems occur because one or more institutions are unable (for lack or resources or ignorance) or unwilling (for gain or ideology) to undertake a preventive strategy.

What the current models do not represent is that in diverse ENVIRONMENTS and within the framework of diverse EVENTS, firstly (1) the roles and agendas of first-line practitioners and stakeholders vary and intersect each other and, secondly, (2) these entities are composed of many sub-groups, each with their own often competing interests and agendas, where security can be manipulated in the pursuit of non-transparent goals.

LEAs and intelligence forces are bodies of the state and in some cases, as we have seen, the governments which are expressions of certain states are one of the factors that facilitate criminal or terrorist phenomena, whether voluntarily (collusion) or involuntarily.

Capable Guardians and Handlers, on the other hand, are usually elements rooted in civil society, especially if they are not public servants. However, their interests do not always coincide with those of governments. It is not just a question of politics, of majorities and opposition, radicalism, social movements or terrorism. Where, for example, political power ends up as local prey to mafia organisations, which control how politicians are elected and how public procurement is conducted, it is then that citizens or individual groups can no longer share the same goals as their established elite, because the costs they must bear to sustain corrupt governments become unsustainable for the citizens themselves. Similar cases occur today in markedly dictatorial countries, where security is an instrument of repression against citizens.

Then there are communities of immigrants living under contradictory legal and juridical conditions, whose interests are in direct opposition to those of the state and the citizens of that country: the states want to reduce the costs and the political impact of immigration, while the immigrants do not want to return to the wars or desperate situations from which they escaped. The conflict of interests can then take many forms: groups of citizens residing in a state, perhaps already suffering financially due to the economic crisis, do not want to have immigrants who weigh on their welfare or on their job prospects.

Also the environment, where these phenomena occur, plays a decisive role as do the functions of first-line practitioners and stakeholders. Just think about the situations of prison inmates: only an extreme form of do-goodism would sustain that their interests and agendas coincide with those of the guards.

We then have striking cases of phenomena such as wikileaks, which have shown how states act against their citizens in the name of security, in an exercise of power cloaked in security-related narratives. This theme has become increasingly important in recent years and has taken on proportions unknown to prevention models before wikileaks and the advent of the global network.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that within the same category (e.g. ‘security forces’) many other sub-categories coexist, each with its own roles, varying degrees of separation and hierarchy, and not always coinciding.  We have seen how important it is to keep intelligence roles, functions and procedures separate. But the same applies to the judiciary, and for the latter also with clear distinctions between the investigative and judicial functions. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the exchange of information within police forces, magistrates and intelligence agencies, albeit with due procedural restrictions, is a fundamental key to prevention.

These are just a few examples among the many which could be cited, which show how the traditional prevention categories can be much more fluid than what appears on the surface and how the differences and divisions are part of the system that until today has guaranteed checks and balances, freedom and stability. At the same time, these examples also demonstrate the need to make well-regulated changes in the prevention system, thus making relevant activities more consistent with the complexity of the phenomena.

The static nature of the models is probably the main error permeating current prevention policies. Such policies have applied schemes based on the supremacy of the police forces and security-related chains of command to all the problems in some way connected to terrorism and organised crime, in the course of critical and major events. Distinctions and detail are the key to prevention, while ideological labels (terror-related crimes, or mafia-style crimes) appeal to the press, but almost never work if applied to prevention. Similarly, the general labels of ‘stakeholders’ or ‘first-line practitioners’ do not tell us much about the ‘ownership’ and effectiveness of prevention activities, because they hide within them a plurality of elements, interests and operating modes, as well as skills and responsibilities.

So on this specific aspect, the Cube was tasked with introducing new categories of subjects (or ‘forces’) as parts of the security-related viral space, each with different ‘weights’ and ‘instruments’ in the simulation interplay. These include the media, politics, states and supranational organisations, all of which can play an important role in the prevention system.

[1]  Sean M. Zeigler and Meagan Smith, Terrorism Before and During the War on Terror: – a more dangerous world?, Sage Publications, October-December 2017, pg. 1-8, consulted on 2-1-2018 in http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168017739757 . On this topic see also Findley MG and Young JK (2012) Terrorism and civil war: A spatial and temporal approach to a conceptual problem. Perspectives on Politics 10(02): 285–305. Findley MG and Young JK (2015) Terrorism, spoiling, and the resolution of civil wars. The Journal of Politics, 77(4): 1115–1128.

[2] Sean M. Zeigler and Meagan Smith, Terrorism Before and During the War on Terror: A Look at the Numbers, in  War on the Rocks, National Security Network-University of Texas, December 2017

[3] Nick Ross, How to Lose the War on Terror: lessons of a 30 Year War in Northern Ireland, Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 25 (2009), pg. 229-244